Prabhakara’s Theory of Error

This philosophical essay examines how the Prabhakara school of Mīmāṃsā deals with the problem of error. Starting from everyday examples—railway lines seeming to meet in the distance or a stick looking bent in water—it notes that realists struggle to explain such perceptions without undermining belief in an external world, while idealists use them to argue that all experience may be illusory. The Prabhakaras take a distinctive position: they deny that error exists. In their akhyāti (‘non‑apprehension’) theory, cognition is intrinsically valid; apparent mistakes arise when a present perception is accompanied by a memory image and ignorance blends the two, as in seeing silver in a shell. Later recognition of the shell does not negate the earlier cognition but merely adds further knowledge. The article critiques theories which explain error through contradiction or sublation, arguing that one cognition cannot logically destroy another’s content. For the Prabhakaras, each cognitive act has its own valid content and cannot be falsified by a subsequent act; thus, error is illusory. The essay contrasts this view with other Mimamsa and Vedanta theories of illusion, highlighting how the Prabhakaras preserve realism by grounding misapprehension in psychological processes rather than ontological unreliability. By emphasising the infallibility of cognition and the role of memory, the author shows that Prabhakara’s approach avoids scepticism while offering a nuanced account of why perceptions sometimes mislead us.

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