British Policy towards the Afghan War of Succession (1863-68)
Summary
The article examines British policy during the Afghan War of Succession from 1863 to 1868, focusing on the conflict between Sher Ali and his brothers, Afzal Khan and Azim Khan. The author, Anilchandra Banerjee, argues that British policy was characterized by non-interference and a pragmatic willingness to support whichever faction appeared strongest at the time, rather than a consistent strategic alignment. The British, represented by figures like Sir John Lawrence, maintained a stance of observing the internal dynastic struggles without active intervention, offering only vague expressions of hope for compromise. The article details the initial revolt of Afzal Khan in May 1864 against Sher Ali, who had succeeded Dost Muhammad in June 1863. It chronicles the military engagements, such as the battle of Bajgah and the battle near Dashe Soofaid, and the subsequent betrayal of Afzal Khan, who was imprisoned in August 1864. The text highlights how Sher Ali's tyrannical actions, including the confiscation of Afzal Khan's property and the public humiliation of placing him in leg irons, alienated the Afghan chiefs and diminished the Amir's authority. The British sources cited include Foreign Department Proceedings and reports from the British Agent and the Commissioner of Peshawar. The narrative continues with the revolt of Afzal Khan's son, Abdur Rahman Khan, in 1865, who sought refuge in Bokhara. The article notes the temporary intervention of Russia, which pressured the Sultan of Bokhara to withdraw support from Abdur Rahman, thereby saving Sher Ali's position. Following a peace treaty in December 1865, Sher Ali's rule was further undermined by his unpopularity, leading to Afzal Khan's brief return to power in 1866. Ultimately, the article concludes with Sher Ali's recovery of Kabul in August 1868, after which he appealed to the British for financial and military aid. The author illustrates Sher Ali's cynical observation that the British merely supported the side they perceived as momentarily stronger, a conclusion drawn from the British Agent's report of May 1, 1866, and a telegram from the Governor-General on September 10, 1868.
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Conclusion
This article demonstrates that British policy during the Afghan War of Succession (1863–68) was characterized by strict non-interference and a pragmatic, opportunistic approach to regional stability. The British government, under figures like Sir John Lawrence, deliberately refrained from providing military or financial support to any of the warring Barakzai factions, including Sher Ali, Afzal Khan, and Abdur Rahman Khan. This policy of non-intervention was driven by the British desire to avoid entanglement in Afghanistan’s internal dynastic conflicts, instead waiting to recognize the de facto ruler of the territory. Consequently, the British maintained a passive, spectator role, observing the collapse and restoration of Sher Ali's authority while ensuring their own strategic interests remained uncompromised. The study highlights how this hands-off stance allowed the British to manage their frontier without direct military engagement, ultimately shaping the political landscape of Afghanistan during a period of intense internal strife.