Omniscient Beings
Summary
Harisatya Bhattacharyya’s essay “Omniscient Beings” examines the nature and possibility of omniscience from the Jain perspective. In Jain epistemology there are five principal kinds of knowledge—sensory knowledge (mati), scriptural knowledge (śruta), clairvoyant knowledge (avadhi), telepathic knowledge (manahparyāya) and omniscience (kevala). Kevala‑jñāna is described as the fifth form of cognition and the highest type of extra‑sensory perception; it “knows and sees all the substances, entire space, all the three‑time period and all the modes”. According to the Āvasyaka Niryukti, kevala‑jñāna is infinite, eternal, imperishable and without gradation. The author contrasts this Jain view with the non‑Jain systems of Indian philosophy. The Vedic schools and Mīmāṃsakas generally posit a creator God and attribute omniscience to that deity, but they deny that finite beings can ever become omniscient. Buddhist philosophers, who also deny the existence of a creator, hold that omniscience is impossible for embodied souls; at best, liberation (nirvāṇa) signifies extinction and not the acquisition of boundless knowledge. Bhattacharyya shows that Jainism differs fundamentally from both these positions. Jains reject an architect God and argue that omniscience is attainable by liberated beings (kevalins) without presupposing a divine creator. The author discusses how the Jain concept of omniscient beings (Tīrthaṅkaras and Arhats) arises from the destruction of knowledge‑obscuring karmas and the realisation of the soul’s intrinsic pure cognition. In this scheme, the mundane soul is clouded by karmic matter and acquires partial knowledge, whereas the liberated soul, having burned away the karmas through right faith, right knowledge and right conduct, attains kevala‑jñāna. The article explains that this omniscience is not intellectual in the ordinary sense but a spiritual state in which all knowable objects—past, present and future, corporeal and non‑corporeal—are intuited simultaneously. It is “pure, absolute, complete and infinite knowledge” and does not involve the senses or mind; rather, it is the soul’s own cognising faculty. The essay also analyses scriptural classifications of omniscience: Bhāvastha kevala‑jñāna (omniscience in the worldly state) and Siddha kevala‑jñāna (omniscience in the liberated state), noting that the purity of knowledge is the same in both. It discusses the ethical and spiritual disciplines necessary to attain omniscience and the significance of the omniscient beings as perfect exemplars for human behaviour. By comparing Jainism with Buddhist and Vedic thought, Bhattacharyya highlights the distinctive Jain assertion that omniscience is neither the privilege of a creator nor an impossibility but the natural fruition of spiritual practice. The essay invites readers to reflect on the implications of a non‑theistic yet achievable omniscience and shows how it integrates epistemology, metaphysics and ethics in Jain philosophy.
Summary reviewed by a volunteer editor.
Conclusion
Bhattacharyya concludes that the Jain doctrine of omniscient beings offers a unique epistemological position. Whereas other Indian schools either reserve omniscience for a creator or deny its possibility, Jainism holds that omniscience is the soul’s natural state when karmic obstructions are destroyed. Kevala‑jñāna is defined as knowledge that comprehends all substances and their modes and is “pure, absolute, complete and infinite”. Achieving it requires ethical purification and spiritual discipline. The concept thus bridges metaphysics and praxis and provides a powerful ideal for human aspiration.