Jaina Concept of Memory
Summary
M. L. Mehta’s article explores how Jain philosophers conceptualise memory. Drawing on classical sources such as the Nandī‑sūtra, Tattvārtha‑bhāṣya and commentaries by Hemacandra and Akalaṅka, the paper breaks memory into four factors: retention (dhāraṇā), reproduction, recognition and localisation. Retention refers to preserving a percept in the mind after initial perception; reproduction is the revival of the percept as an image; recognition involves identifying the image as belonging to a previously experienced object; localisation situates the revived image in time and space. Mehta contrasts Jain views with other Indian schools, noting that some grammarians equate retention with the absence of forgetting, while others see it as the consolidation of perception. The article explains that, in Jain epistemology, retention is not a separate condition for later recall but coexists with perception; it represents the endurance of mental traces (saṃskāra) that allow the revival of past experiences when stimulated. Mehta discusses Umāsvāti’s view that latent mental traces are cognitive in nature; if they were non‑cognitive they could not give rise to conscious recollection. The emergence of recollection depends on an external or internal stimulus that excites the latent trace. Recognition, meanwhile, is described as a synthetic judgement combining perception and recollection; it asserts the identity of a past object with a present one through expressions like ‘that is this’. Mehta stresses that recognition differs from mere recollection because it asserts identity and difference within the same cognition. The author also reflects on judgments of similarity and dissimilarity, explaining that they derive from comparative recognition and are crucial to knowledge. By analysing examples and quotes from commentaries, the paper shows how Jain thinkers differentiated memory from perception and argued that memory cannot serve as a pramāṇa (means of valid knowledge) independently. Instead, memory relies on prior valid cognition and serves as a reminder rather than a source of new knowledge. The study highlights the sophistication of Jain epistemology and its engagement with psychological questions that are still relevant to modern cognitive theories.
AI-generated summary, automatically checked against the article text.
Conclusion
Mehta concludes that the Jain theory of memory is a nuanced account of how mental traces persist and are revived. Retention and recollection are not separate stages but overlapping processes grounded in past valid cognition. Recognition synthesises recollection with present perception, allowing one to identify an object as the same as previously experienced. This holistic view underscores the Jain emphasis on the relational nature of knowledge and illustrates the tradition’s contribution to Indian epistemology and psychology.