The Authority of the King in Kautilya's Political Thought
Summary
U. N. Ghoshal re‑examines Kautilya’s Arthashastra to determine what authority it accords to royal decrees. At first sight Kautilya’s list of sources of law—dharma, vyavahara, caritra and rājāśāsana—seems to make the king’s command the highest norm. Ghoshal argues that the verse cited by modern scholars actually occurs in Kautilya’s chapter on judicial procedure. There it means that when judging suits the court looks first to religious law and equity, then to agreements and custom, and finally to the royal edict if no other source applies. For substantive law dealing with property, contracts and social obligations Kautilya elsewhere enumerates dharma, vyavahara, samstha and nyāya and excludes the king’s will. Ghoshal compares Kautilya with earlier smriti writers who recognised the king only as a guardian of law; he notes that the Arthashastra gives the king an independent power to issue decrees but stresses that they must conform to dharma and usage. The article surveys how later writers like Nāradá and Mitāksharā interpreted Kautilya, shows that Kautilya viewed law as rooted in moral order and collective practices, and traces how the Arthashastra integrates absolutist elements with checks on royal power. Ghoshal concludes that Kautilya’s king has broad administrative discretion yet remains bound by ethical norms; the Arthashastra advocates a strong but not despotic monarchy governed by justice and duty.
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Conclusion
Ghoshal’s study suggests that Kautilya did not advocate unchecked absolutism. He treated royal edicts as one source of procedural law but subordinated them to dharma and accepted usages. The king’s authority was meant to enforce justice, not override it, and the Arthashastra thus anticipates a constitutional monarchy where sovereignty is constrained by moral and customary law.