शीलन
Summary
The text discusses the role of logic (tarka) in Indian philosophical traditions, particularly within the Nyaya-Vaisheshika school. It argues that while logic can play a significant role in grasping the pervasiveness (vyapti) of a reason, it cannot by itself lead to certainty. The text states that other forms of evidence (pramanas) may also help determine the meaning of something, but certainty is never achieved through logic alone. It explains that logic is not considered a valid means of knowledge (pramana) in its own right, but it is nonetheless an essential aid (anugrahaka) to pramanas. The passage emphasizes that in the Nyaya-Vaisheshika tradition, logic does not have an independent or autonomous status; rather, inference (anumana) holds a supreme position. The text is attributed to Prof. Sachchidanand Mishra and appears in the July 2012 issue of Jain Bharati.
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Conclusion
The implications of this analysis underscore the inherent limitations of logic (tarka) in achieving certainty, as it cannot independently establish truth despite its role in grasping inference (vyapti). Within the Nyaya-Vaisheshika tradition, logic lacks autonomous epistemic authority; it functions instead as a supportive tool that aids valid cognition (pramana) without being a pramana itself. This distinction reinforces the primacy of inference (anumana) as a superior means of knowledge, while relegating logic to a subsidiary, corroborative role. The outcome reaffirms that certainty arises only through direct or inferential pramanas, not through logical reasoning alone. Consequently, the document highlights a critical epistemological boundary: logic facilitates understanding but cannot substitute for the foundational validity of pramanas, thereby preserving the hierarchical structure of knowledge acquisition in classical Indian philosophy.