Number of Pramanas
By R. D. Hegde
Summary
This article examines the Carvaka perspective on the number of pramanas, or valid means of knowledge, and its refutation by Bhatta Jayanta, the author of the Nyayamanjari. The author situates Jayanta within the ancient Naiyayika camp, noting that he represents early Nyaya polemics before the amalgamation with Nyaya-Vaisesika thought. During the time of Jayanta, Carvaka and Buddhist thinkers were prominent rivals to the Nyaya system, actively attacking its epistemology and keeping Naiyayikas in a state of constant debate, as evidenced in the works of Vatsyayana, Uddyotakara, and Vachaspati Misra. The main argument of the Carvakas, as discussed in Jayanta's Nyayamanjari, is that pramanas are innumerable and correspond directly to the prameyas, or objects of valid knowledge. They argue that any attempt to define pramanas is futile because they function differently in different circumstances. To support this, the Carvakas present three specific examples. First, they discuss the cognition of one's fingers being crooked and distant in a dark room. The article details Jayanta's refutation of this, arguing that such cognition is not perceptual because the sense of touch cannot apprehend the fingers without light, nor is it inferential because it lacks knowledge of vyapti, or invariable relation. The article notes that analogy and verbal testimony are also incompetent to produce this cognition. Second, the Carvakas use the example of the spreading of a lamp-light in the night. The cognition of this pervasion is not perceptual because space is not perceptible, nor is it inferential due to the absence of a known invariable relation. Third, they analyze the cognition of a distant lotus-lake through its fragrance carried by the wind. The olfactory sense perceives the fragrance, but the knowledge of the distant lake's existence is argued to be beyond the capacity of the olfactory sense and not inferential, as it relies on a remembered invariable relation between fragrance and the lake. Jayanta refutes these theories by first classifying the means of valid knowledge and then testing them practically, proving that the number of pramanas cannot be determined by the number of prameyas. The article concludes that Jayanta's analysis is not merely mechanical but requires real intelligence, thereby refuting the Carvaka view of infinite pramanas. The discussion is supported by extensive references to Jayanta's Nyayamanjari, the Granthibhasha, Nyayasaurabha, and other scholarly works including those of S.N. Dasgupta and Th. Stcherbatsky.
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Conclusion
This article examines the Carvaka challenge to the Nyaya epistemological framework, specifically their radical claim that pramanas are innumerable, equating them directly with the objects of valid knowledge (prameyas). The Carvakas argued that standard means of knowledge, such as perception and inference, are inadequate to account for certain valid cognitions, citing examples like feeling the shape of fingers in a dark room, perceiving the spatial pervasion of a lamp's light, and cognizing a distant lotus lake through its fragrance. Jayanta Bhatta, representing the ancient Naiyayika school in his *Nyayamanjari*, systematically refutes this position. His analysis demonstrates that these peculiar cognitions are not produced by entirely new, independent means of knowledge. Instead, they are shown to be complex applications or limitations of established pramanas. Consequently, the article highlights the methodological rigor of the Nyaya school in classifying and testing its epistemological tools, thereby reaffirming that the number of pramanas is finite and cannot be determined by the sheer multiplicity of prameyas.