The Problems of 'Definition' and 'Perception' in Sri Madhva's Epistemology
Summary
This philosophical article explores Sri Madhva’s epistemology as presented by Jayatirtha. It first considers the nature of definition (lakshana). According to Madhva, a valid definition must be present in every instance of the defined class and absent from all others. The article illustrates how partial definitions lead to fallacies: defining a cow merely as 'horned' includes buffaloes and goats, while defining dewlap as unique to cows overlooks other exclusive traits. Both necessary and sufficient conditions are required. The discussion then shifts to perception. Madhva rejects the Advaitin idea of an indeterminate, attributeless perception. For him, perception always reveals determinate objects endowed with attributes and is clarified through contact between sense organs, mind and objects. Madhva posits an infinite number of vishesas (individual differentiators) that distinguish every entity; these vishesas enable determinate cognition. By insisting on determinate perception and precise definitions, Madhva upholds a pluralistic ontology. The article concludes that Madhva’s epistemology undergirds his theistic realism, contrasting sharply with Advaita’s monistic views.
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Conclusion
Through careful exegesis, the author shows that Madhva’s epistemology insists on precise definitions that both include all instances and exclude all non‑instances, reflecting his commitment to realism. His theory of perception rejects any attributionless awareness; cognition is always determinate and reveals objects endowed with unique vishesas. This underscores Dvaita’s pluralism and stands in contrast to monistic philosophies. The discussion illuminates how Madhva’s epistemology supports his theistic metaphysics and fosters logical rigour in defining and apprehending reality.