A Brief Account of the Jaina View of Inference
By Gour Hazra
Summary
The article presents a detailed account of the Jaina view of inference, known as anumana, which is defined as the method of knowing an unperceived object through the perception of a sign (hetu) and the recollection of its invariable concomitance with the object. The author, Gour Hazra, establishes that inference is a complex process accepted by all schools of Indian thought except the Carvaka, and contrasts the Jaina perspective with those of the Naiyayikas, Bauddhas, Sankhyas, Mimansakas, Vaisesikas, and various Buddhist philosophers. The Jaina logician Acarya Akalanka defines anumana as the cognition of sadhya produced by sadhana, following linga-grahana and vyaptismarana, while Hemacandra defines it as the knowledge of sadhya from sadhana. The core of the Jaina argument centers on vyapti, or invariable concomitance, which the Jainas accept as the sole essential constituent of inference. They reject the Naiyayika concept of paksa-dharmatva, a term first used by the Buddhist logician Sankara Svamin, arguing that only vyapti is necessary. The article further explains the Jaina classification of inference into two types: svarthanumana (inference for one's own self) and pararthanumana (inference for others' sake, or syllogistic inference). The Jaina logicians, including Siddhasena, Akalanka, Vidyananda, and Mallisena, accept this distinction, which was first introduced by the Buddhist philosopher Dignaga. Regarding syllogistic inference, the Jaina view is notably minimalist. They hold that a syllogism for an intelligent person requires only the thesis (paksa) and the reason (hetu), opposing the views of other schools that require three, four, or five parts. For less-intelligent persons, the Jainas accept a ten-limbed syllogism as found in Bhadrabahu’s Dasavaikalika-niryukti, though they ultimately argue that the example, application, and conclusion are superfluous because vyapti is already known through induction. The article also discusses anumanabhava, or fallacy. While Siddhasena divides paksabhasa into two divisions and hetvabhasa into three kinds (asiddha, viruddha, and anaikantika), the later logician Akalanka asserts only two kinds of anumanabhava: paksabhasa and hetvabhasa, stating that drstantabhasa is not essential because svarthanumana consists of only two premises. The Jainas criticize the multi-aspect views of the Buddhists and Naiyayikas, admitting only the anyathanupopannatva, also called avinabhava or vyapti, as the essential characteristic of a hetu.
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Conclusion
This article elucidates the distinct Jaina perspective on anumana, emphasizing its reliance on vyapti, or invariable concomitance, as the sole essential constituent of inference, thereby rejecting the Nyaya school’s paksa-dharmatva. The Jaina framework categorizes inference into svarthanumana, a psychological process for oneself, and pararthanumana, a logical syllogism for others. Significantly, Jainas argue that a syllogism requires only a thesis and a reason for an intelligent person, though they accommodate longer, ten-limbed syllogisms for less-intelligent audiences. The Jaina critique of hetvabhasa further refines this theory by identifying three primary fallacies—asiddha, viruddha, and anaikantika—as manifestations of a single underlying defect in the necessary concomitance of the reason, underscoring the Jainas' rigorous and pragmatic approach to logical methodology.