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Refutation of Advaita Vedanta in Major Jaina Works

By Yajneshwar S. Shastri

Vol. 20 · No. 3Jan - 1986pp. 77–88English
Perception Reality Debate

Summary

This paper by Yajneshwar S. Shastri reviews how Jaina philosophers used the classical method of purvapakṣa‑uttarapakṣa: they first summarized the opponent’s position and then refuted it with their own siddhānta. Shastri surveys major Jaina works that deal with the non‑dualistic Advaita Vedānta system. In Advaita, Brahman is the ultimate reality and the phenomenal world is dismissed as māyā; individual souls (jīvas) are considered illusory and identical with a single, attributeless. Jain philosophers accept that liberation and the removal of karmic bondage are the highest goals but they reject Advaita’s monism and idea of a creator. Jain thinkers hold that an infinite number of independent souls exist, each of which can attain omniscience and liberation without merging into a single substance. This multiplicity is defended using the doctrines of anekāntavāda and syādvāda; reality is complex and can only be understood through multiple viewpoints, so no single description (such as “only Brahman is real”) is final Shastri discusses how Jain authors like Samantabhadra, Siddhasena Divākara and Haribhadra systematically critiqued Advaita. They argued that if Brahman is changeless and without qualities, it cannot produce the changing world, and Advaitins’ reliance on māyā does not explain how an illusory world can bind the soul. They also pointed out that Advaita’s claim of one universal soul contradicts everyday experience of individual moral responsibility; Jainism requires each soul to perform right conduct (samvara) to stop the influx of karma and right ascetic practices (nirjarā) to burn existing karma. In Shastri’s view, the Jaina critique does not deny common ethical elements such as karma and the goal of liberation, but it emphasises pluralism, realism and self‑effort. By studying and rebutting the positions of Advaita, Jaina authors clarified their own doctrines and enriched inter‑sectarian dialogue. The paper concludes that despite occasional borrowing of concepts from Vedānta, major Jaina works consistently refute Advaita’s absolutism and uphold a doctrine of many eternal, uncreated souls bound by karma and liberated through knowledge, faith and conduct.

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Conclusion

Shastri’s survey shows that Jain philosophers were well‑versed in Vedāntic literature but rejected its core assumptions. Advaita posits a single, formless Brahman and treats the world as a dream; Jain thinkers argue instead for a pluralistic universe in which countless souls and matter co‑exist eternally. Using anekāntavāda, they contend that reality can only be known through multiple conditional viewpoints. Jaina works therefore refute Advaita’s monism and emphasise that liberation is achieved not by identifying with Brahman but by stopping karma and cultivating right conduct. The enduring dialogue between these traditions enriched Indian philosophy by clarifying contrasting conceptions of self, world and ultimate reality.

Key passages

Chosen by AI from the article's text. Each one is checked word for word against the text before it is shown.

  • “Jaina philosophers also following the same broad-minded tradition, presented views of all the systems of Indian thought with considerable care and established their own principles refuting opponent’s view with logical rigour.”
  • “Jainism is a system of realism, dualism and pluralism. It is a realism because it recognises the reality of the external world, it is a kind of dualism, because it advocates two fundamental realities the jiva (soul) and the gjiva® (matter) which are obviously contradictorily related to each other, and a pluralism on account of belief in plurality of substance.®”
  • “Advaita Vedanta believes in absolute non-dualism while Jainism - advocates non-absolutism or many-sided theory of Reality (anekantavada). It rejects both the extreme view of absolute eternality as well as absolute non-existence.”

Works cited in this article

  1. Vakyapadiya
  2. Brhattika
  3. Vedantadarsanam (R.P.), Pt. S. Subrahmanya Shastri, pub. Varanasiya Sanskrit Visvavidyalaya, 1967.
  4. Brhati, part-1, p. 239, pub. University of Madras, 1934.
  5. Nyayamanjari, 11, Apavarga Pariksa, p. 431-2, pub. Oriental Institute, Mysore, 1983.

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