Compatibility of Radhakrishnan's Metaphysics with his Epistemology and Ethics
By J. A. Yajnik
Summary
This paper examines the compatibility of Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan's metaphysics with his epistemology and ethics, arguing that his metaphysical absolutism is incompatible with his realistic epistemology and ethical objectivism. The author contends that Radhakrishnan's epistemology is fundamentally realistic, standing for the view that knowledge must be revelatory of reality, and is not idealism in the sense of Berkeley or Hegel. The paper cites Radhakrishnan's Hibbert Lectures, "An Idealist View of Life," and observations by D.M. Datta and Charles Hartshorne to clarify that Radhakrishnan's idealism is actually a form of realism akin to Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas. Radhakrishnan recognizes three ways of acquiring knowledge: sense-experience, discursive reasoning, and intuitive apprehension, all of which presuppose a realistic distinction between subject and object. Radhakrishnan's ethical theory is presented as ethical objectivism, asserting that spiritual values are constitutive of ultimate reality and appeal to us as ideals. The paper provides numerous citations from Radhakrishnan's works to support this claim, emphasizing that truth, beauty, and goodness are objective facts. However, the paper argues that Radhakrishnan's metaphysical absolutism, which conceives the Absolute as the only unconditional ultimate reality, is incompatible with his epistemology and ethics. The Absolute is described as the sum-total of reality, with God, the world (jiva), and the individual (jagat) as contingent items. This view, influenced by thinkers like Bradley and Alexander, leads to agnosticism and subjectivism, undermining the realistic distinction between knower and known. Furthermore, the paper argues that Radhakrishnan's God resembles Whitehead's God, lacking the qualities necessary for religious purposes, and that the teleological character of the world and the eternality of God are undermined by this metaphysical framework. To resolve this incompatibility, the author proposes an improved version of Radhakrishnan's metaphysics by eliminating the distinction between God and the Absolute. This would align his metaphysics with his epistemology and ethics, resulting in a form of Visishtadvaitic theism comparable to Ramanujacharya or Sri Svatninsrayana. The paper concludes that Radhakrishnan's own writings support this identification, as he acknowledges the unity of the Absolute and God in religious experience.
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Conclusion
This paper demonstrates that Radhakrishnan's metaphysics is fundamentally incompatible with his epistemology and ethics. While his epistemology is a robust realism and his ethics an objectivism affirming the reality of spiritual values, his metaphysical absolutism renders the material world and God mere contingent manifestations of an unknowable Absolute. This view negates the ontological status of the empirical world, undermines the validity of sense experience, and reduces God to a temporary phase of cosmic evolution. Consequently, the author argues that Radhakrishnan’s metaphysics must be revised. By eliminating the distinction between the Absolute and God, his system can be reinterpreted as a form of qualified non-dualistic theism, akin to Ramanuja’s Vishishtadvaita, thereby achieving the coherence his philosophy requires.