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Jayanta on the Buddhist Definition of Perception

By Nagin J Shah

Vol. 161989pp. 3–17English

Summary

This study analyses the eighth‑century philosopher Jayantabhaṭṭa’s critique of the Buddhist definition of perception from a Nyāya perspective. Jayanta engages with Buddhist epistemologists who define perception as a non‑conceptual cognition free from mental constructions and error. He acknowledges the Buddhist concern to distinguish valid cognition from illusory appearance but argues that their definition is both too narrow and philosophically problematic. The author outlines Jayanta’s objections. First, he contends that perception cannot be devoid of conceptual content because recognising an object invariably involves class concepts and linguistic conventions. Without some relation to universals, sense data would remain indeterminate. Second, he challenges the Buddhist claim that perception must be error‑free, noting that errors such as mistaking a rope for a snake occur at the level of perception itself. The article details Jayanta’s analysis of such errors to show that perception is not infallible and that a theory of knowledge must account for misperception. Jayanta also defends the Nyāya assertion that perception apprehends external objects as they are. He criticises the Buddhist view that objects are momentary constructions of consciousness and argues that the enduring existence of external reality is necessary to explain memory and practical activity. The article highlights Jayanta’s use of logical analysis and illustrative examples to dismantle Buddhist arguments. By examining Jayanta’s reasoning, the author reveals the richness of classical Indian debates on epistemology. The discussion demonstrates how Jayanta synthesises earlier Nyāya contributions while engaging critically with his Buddhist contemporaries. The article concludes that Jayanta’s critique not only exposes weaknesses in the Buddhist definition but also refines Nyāya’s own understanding of perception as a complex process involving sense contact, mental construction and verification.

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Conclusion

The conclusion summarises that Jayanta’s critique emphasises the indispensability of conceptual and linguistic elements in perception and challenges the Buddhist attempt to isolate a pure, error‑free perceptual moment. His arguments reinforce the Nyāya position that perception apprehends a mind‑independent world and underscore the importance of addressing error within any theory of knowledge.

Key passages

Chosen by AI from the article's text. Each one is checked word for word against the text before it is shown.

  • “Jayanta first presents the Buddhist's case on the question of perception and then refutes it.”
  • “Kalpana (=vikalpa) is the Buddhist's word for thought and Jayanta asks him : 'Granted that kalpana is that type of apprehension of an object, which is capable of being associated with a word,, why should it be denied the status of a pramana (=valid cognition)?'”
  • “A true cognition is that which does not deal with things unreal but what a word stands for is not something' real.”

Works cited in this article

  1. Agamadambara
  2. Buddhist Logic, Volume I
  3. Buddhist Logic, Volume II

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