Interpretation of the "Anatta" doctrine of Buddhism: a new approach

This paper re-examines the Buddhist doctrine of anattā (Pāli) or anātman (Sanskrit)—often translated as “non-self.” Classical Indian philosophy, particularly the Upaniṣads, posits an eternal Self (ātman). The Buddha rejected the notion of an enduring soul and taught that individuals are composed of five aggregates (form, feeling, perception, volitional formations, and consciousness). The article surveys early discourses where the Buddha explains that the aggregates are impermanent, unsatisfactory, and devoid of self. It then discusses later Abhidharma interpretations that further analyse the constituents of experience. Drawing on modern scholarship and comparative philosophy, the author proposes a new interpretation: instead of seeing anatta as a nihilistic denial of existence, it should be understood as a pragmatic strategy for deconstructing clinging. The article emphasises that anatta does not deny the empirical person but denies a permanent substance underlying the aggregates. Citing the Pāli Canon, the author notes that the Buddha taught that belief in a self leads to craving and suffering; liberation arises when the illusion of self is seen through. The article contrasts anatta with the Upaniṣadic notion of ātman and with Western psychological conceptions of ego. It suggests that the anatta doctrine encourages ethical behaviour and compassion because it undermines egoistic separation. The new approach advocated sees anatta not as a metaphysical doctrine but as a transformative insight into the conditioned nature of experience. The author concludes that understanding anatta in this way can make Buddhist thought more accessible to modern readers.

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