परीक्षामुख एवं प्रमेयकमलमार्त्तण्ड में 'अनुमान' की अवधारणा
Summary
The article examines the concept of inference (anumāna) in Jain philosophy, specifically as presented in the texts *Parīkṣāmukha* by Māṇikyanandi and *Prameyakamalamārttaṇḍa* by Prabhācandra. It begins by establishing that Jain philosophy considers knowledge itself as valid cognition (pramāṇa), which is divided into direct (pratyakṣa) and indirect (parokṣa) knowledge. Inference is one of five types of indirect knowledge. Māṇikyanandi defines inference as the knowledge of the probandum (sādhya) from the probans (sādhana). Prabhācandra elaborates, stating that inference requires a probans that is invariably concomitant with the probandum, meaning the probans is absent when the probandum is absent. The probandum must be possible, intended, and unestablished. The fundamental components of inference are the probans (hetu), the probandum (sādhya), and the subject (pakṣa or dharmī). The probans is defined as that which is ascertained to have an invariable relationship (avinābhāva) with the probandum. This invariable concomitance is the essential characteristic of a valid probans. The probans is effective only for establishing doubtful, contrary, or unascertained objects, not for those already established. Probans is of two types: probans of presence (upalabdhi hetu) and probans of non-apprehension (anupalabdhi hetu). Both can establish either affirmation or negation. Based on affirmation and negation, each type has two further subdivisions. The probans of presence is divided into non-contradictory (aviruddhopalabdhi) and contradictory (viruddhopalabdhi). Non-contradictory probans establishes affirmation, while contradictory probans establishes negation. The non-contradictory probans of presence has six subtypes, each illustrated with examples: (1) non
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Conclusion
This analysis of *Parīkṣāmukha* and *Prameyakamalamārttaṇḍa* clarifies the Jain theory of inference (*anumāna*), emphasizing its rigorous logical structure. By defining the *hetu* (reason) through necessary concomitance (*avinābhāva*) and classifying it into types like *upalabdhi* and *anupalabdhi*, the texts provide a systematic method for valid knowledge. The detailed breakdown of *aviruddha* and *viruddha* subtypes demonstrates how inference can establish both positive and negative conclusions. This framework not only strengthens Jain epistemology but also offers practical tools for debate and reasoning. The implication is that inference, when properly applied, serves as a reliable means of knowledge, bridging perception and scriptural authority. Ultimately, this analysis underscores the sophistication of Jain logic and its enduring relevance for philosophical inquiry.