आचार्य प्रभाचन्द्र द्वारा प्रतिपादित प्रमाण : स्वरूप एवं विश्लेषण
Summary
The article examines the concept of *pramāṇa* (valid knowledge) as propounded by Ācārya Prabhācandra, a 10th-century Jain philosopher. It begins by situating *pramāṇa* within Indian philosophy, where it is considered essential for establishing the nature of reality (*prameya*). The text outlines the historical development of Jain epistemology across three ages: the Āgama age, the Darśana age, and the *Pramāṇa* age, noting contributions from thinkers like Siddhasena, Akalaṅka, and Haribhadra. Ācārya Prabhācandra’s definition of *pramāṇa* is given as *svāpūrvārthavyavasāyātmakaṃ jñānaṃ pramāṇam*, meaning knowledge that definitively ascertains an object that is both itself and unprecedented. This definition is analyzed through its five components: *sva* (self), *apūrva* (unprecedented), *artha* (object), *vyavasāyātmaka* (determinate), and *jñāna* (knowledge). The article contrasts this with definitions from other schools, such as the Buddhist view of *pramāṇa* as non-contradictory cognition and the Nyāya view as the apprehension of an object. It emphasizes that Prabhācandra’s definition refutes Buddhist and Mīmāṃsaka positions by asserting that knowledge is self-luminous and illuminates others. The article then discusses the two main divisions of *pramāṇa*: *pratyakṣa* (direct perception), which is clear and not dependent on the senses, and *parokṣa* (indirect knowledge), which is unclear. *Parokṣa* is further subdivided into five types: *smṛti* (memory), *pratyabhijñāna* (recognition), *tarka
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Conclusion
This analysis confirms that Ācārya Prabhācandra’s epistemology, as detailed in the *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa*, systematically refutes rival Buddhist, Nyāya, and Mīmāṃsā positions by insisting that valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) must be both self-luminous and determinative of a novel object (*svapūrvārtha*). The implication is a robustly realist Jain epistemology that grounds knowledge in the soul’s intrinsic capacity for certainty, rejecting both the Buddhist restriction of *pramāṇa* to non-contradictory awareness and the Mīmāṃsā view that cognition is inferable. By classifying memory, recognition, reasoning, inference, and scripture as valid *parokṣa* instruments, Prabhācandra provides a comprehensive framework for ascertaining reality across all three times. The outcome is a sophisticated defense of *anekāntavāda