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Indian Philosophy and Hedonism

By M. Hiriyanna

Vol. 22 · No. 4December - 1946pp. 263–268English

Summary

In Indian Philosophy and Hedonism, M. Hiriyanna investigates whether Indian thinkers advocated hedonism and how they defined value. He distinguishes psychological hedonism, which sees pleasure as the motive for action, from ethical hedonism, which makes pleasure the highest good. Hiriyanna surveys key schools of Indian thought. The materialist Cārvāka doctrine asserts that direct sensory enjoyment is the only reality and encourages living for worldly pleasure. By contrast, Jainism and Buddhism teach that attachments to pleasure cause suffering; they advocate self‑control and liberation through ethical conduct. Within Hindu philosophy, the Upaniṣads and Vedānta place ultimate value in knowledge of the Self (ātman) and liberation (mokṣa), although they do not deny that pleasure has value when subordinated to dharma and artha. The author notes that while the Epics and Dharmaśāstras recognise four ends of life (puruṣārthas)—dharma (duty), artha (wealth), kāma (pleasure) and mokṣa (liberation)—they do not rank pleasure highest. Pleasure is legitimate but must be pursued harmoniously with virtue and spiritual goals. Hiriyanna also analyses concepts like ananda (bliss) in the Upaniṣads, which transcend physical enjoyment and denote spiritual fulfillment. He concludes that no mainstream Indian system endorses pure hedonism; even materialist traditions temper pleasure with prudence. Instead, Indian philosophy offers a balanced approach: pleasure is part of human experience but is neither an end in itself nor the ultimate standard of value. The paper illustrates this with textual quotations, highlighting that Indian aesthetics links pleasure with rasa (taste) and emotional refinement rather than crude indulgence. In sum, Hiriyanna demonstrates that Indian thought integrates psychological insights about pleasure with ethical and metaphysical considerations, leading to a nuanced evaluation of hedonism.

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Conclusion

Hiriyanna concludes that Indian philosophy does not espouse hedonism in its extreme sense. Pleasure is acknowledged as one of life’s aims but is subordinated to ethical duty, worldly welfare and spiritual liberation. The Indian tradition therefore offers a holistic perspective in which true happiness arises from self‑knowledge rather than mere sensual enjoyment.

Key passages

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  • “Uddyotakara says that while some thihk that dharma, artha, kama or mokga is the object desired, he himself considers it to be the attainment of pleasure (sukha-prapti) or the avoidance of pain (duhkha-nivrtti).?”
  • “The Indian conception of value, as now prevalent, may accordingly appear to be fundamentally hedonistic, and the purpose of the present article is to find out whether it is really so.”

Works cited in this article

  1. Nydyyp-varttika, p. 13. (Benares Edn.)
  2. Siddbanta-muktavali, p. 467 (Nim. Sag. Edn.) and Vedanta-paribbasa, viii.
  3. 0. it. 1-3, 133 v. 12-13.
  4. Tait. Up. Il. viii and Br. Up. IV. iii. 32.
  5. Bhoja's Sarasvasti-kanthabharana (v. 74).

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