हिंसा
By प्रो. महेन्द्रकुमार जैन, न्यायाचार्य
Summary
The text defines violence (hiṃsā) as the deprivation of life (prāṇavyaparopaṇa) caused by a person acting with negligence (pramatta). It explains that "vyaparopaṇa" means separation, and the term "prāṇavyaparopaṇa" specifically refers to the separation of the vital forces (prāṇa). The text clarifies that the mention of "prāṇa" (vital forces) is made because the separation of a living being (prāṇivyaparopaṇa) is preceded by the separation of these vital forces. Since a living being (prāṇin) is inherently indivisible (niravayava), its direct separation is impossible; thus, violence is defined through the separation of the vital forces. A potential objection is raised: if the soul (ātman) is distinct from the vital forces, then the separation of the vital forces would not affect the soul, and thus no demerit (adharma) would arise. The text refutes this by stating that the separation of vital forces produces pain (duḥkha) in the associated soul, thereby establishing demerit. Another objection suggests that since the embodied soul (śarīrin) is different from the body, it should not experience pain from bodily separation. The text counters this by pointing out that even in the case of separation from completely distinct entities like sons and wives, the soul experiences distress (tāpa). Therefore, the separation of the vital forces, which are only partially distinct, must also cause pain to the soul. The text concludes that although the body and the embodied soul are different in characteristics, they are considered one (eka) with respect to bondage (bandha). Consequently, the pain arising from the separation of the body is experienced by the soul, confirming that such an act constitutes violence and demerit.
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Conclusion
This document’s analysis of *Tattvārtharājavārtika* 7.13 establishes that violence is defined not merely by physical separation of life, but by the intentional act causing pain to the conscious self. The key outcome is the refutation of the view that harming the body is harmless because the soul is distinct from the vital airs. By drawing an analogy to the grief felt at the loss of a child or spouse—entities entirely separate from the self—the text proves that separation of the body’s life-breaths produces real suffering in the soul. This implies that all acts of violence, even those targeting only the physical form, generate karmic bondage and are therefore adharma. The implication is a rigorous ethical standard: any action performed with negligence that causes pain to another being constitutes violence, reinforcing the necessity of vigilant non-harm in thought, word, and deed.