Skip to content
Browse articles

The Jaina Doctrine Of Soul

By Harisatya Bhattacharya

Vol. 25 · No. 7, 8, 9July to September - 1929pp. 172–182English

Summary

The Jaina doctrine of the soul argues that consciousness is intrinsic to the soul's nature, rejecting the Nyaya view of the soul as essentially unconscious. Jainas assert that if the soul were unconscious, knowledge would be impossible, similar to inanimate objects like the sky. They critique the Nyaya concept of "soul-hood" as fallacious, claiming it leads to mutual dependence (Anyonya-samsraya). The perception of "I am a knower" implies consciousness is inherent to the soul, not merely "intimately related" to it. Jainas further argue that the Nyaya position on self-awareness ("I") and knowledge creates an infinite regression (Anavastha), as perceiving "I" and "knowledge" would require prior knowledge, leading to endless dependency. They also challenge the Nyaya doctrine of the soul's immutability, questioning how an unchanging soul could acquire knowledge. The text discusses parthenogenesis in certain organisms as analogous to Sammurchhan (asexual reproduction without fertilization), though the general understanding of Sammurchhan is deemed erroneous.

AI-assisted summary, not yet checked. Consult the original PDF before citing.

Conclusion

The Jaina doctrine of the soul presents a compelling case for consciousness as an intrinsic property of the soul, challenging the Nyaya school's reliance on "intimate connection" as an explanatory mechanism. By demonstrating that the soul's self-awareness ("I am a knower") cannot logically arise from an essentially unconscious substance, the Jaina philosophers expose a critical flaw in the Nyaya position. This argument not only reinforces the soul's conscious nature but also underscores the philosophical implications of self-awareness as direct evidence of consciousness. The critique of the "intimate connection" fallacy and the emphasis on common experiential knowledge solidify the Jaina view, offering a coherent framework for understanding the soul's inherent capacity for awareness. This analysis advances the discourse by highlighting the necessity of re-examining traditional doctrines through rigorous logical scrutiny and empirical observation.

Key passages

Chosen by AI from the article's text. Each one is checked word for word against the text before it is shown.

  • “The Jaina philosophers show how knowledge of objects would be impossible for the soul, if it be held to be essentially unconscious.”

Discussed in this article

AI guide

Discuss this record

Ask about the article, its topics, issue context, selected passages, or reading strategy.

Start with the record

I can unpack the summary, turn it into study questions, explain a selected passage, or compare it with the other articles in this issue.

Original PDF

Inline viewer

Checking source PDF

The viewer will load here if the archive file is reachable.

Same author

More by Harisatya Bhattacharya

All articles →
Jain Journal A Quarterly on Jainology

The Basic Idea of God

By Harisatya Bhattacharya

January - 1999
Jain Journal A Quarterly on Jainology

Omniscient Beings

By Harisatya Bhattacharya

July - 1990
Jain Journal A Quarterly on Jainology

Omniscient Beings

By Harisatya Bhattacharya

Jan - 1977
Jain Journal A Quarterly on Jainology

Omniscient Beings

By Harisatya Bhattacharya

Oct - 1976

Continue reading

Related articles

Jain Journal A Quarterly on Jainology

Mahatma Gandhi and Kavi Rajacandra on Philosophical Discourse

By Brahmacari Sri Govardhanadasa

October - 1995