DISCONNECTED NOTION
By H. Warren
Summary
The text discusses Jain philosophical concepts related to self-creation and the rejection of external attribution for one's existence and actions. It references Schopenhauer's ideas, particularly his critique of theism and the notion that individuals generate their own volitions and ideas rather than receiving them from external sources like a creator. The text argues that volition is exercised, not imparted, and that deeds define a person's existence—existence being synonymous with action. It challenges the belief in an external God as the creator, asserting that such a theory would absurdly imply God creates beings capable of evil. The text also examines the origin of ideas, suggesting they arise internally rather than from external objects, with sensory perceptions merely triggering pre-existing latent concepts. False beliefs (abhigraha mithyatva) stem from self-distortion rather than external sources. A brief mention of Schopenhauer's views on inherited traits from parents is noted but dismissed, as abilities cannot be transmitted externally. The text emphasizes that individuals shape themselves through their thoughts, words, and deeds, aligning with Jain principles of renunciation and self-determination.
Summary reviewed by a volunteer editor.
Conclusion
This document explores the convergence of Jain and Schopenhauerian thought, highlighting the shared emphasis on self-creation through renunciation and the rejection of external agency in shaping existence. By analyzing Schopenhauer’s assertion that “we make ourselves what we are” alongside Jain principles of *abhigraha mithyatva* (false belief), the text underscores the self-dependent nature of volition and existence. The merging of divergent paths in the seventh *pratima* symbolizes the ultimate unity of these ideas, reinforcing the significance of self-determined action over external attribution. The implications challenge theistic frameworks, advocating for a rational examination of inherited beliefs and emphasizing agency in forging one’s existence through thought, word, and deed. This synthesis offers a compelling case for reorienting spiritual and philosophical inquiry toward the self’s transformative capacity.