युक्त्यनुशासनालंकार में प्रतिपादित नय
By Sangeeta Mehta, Br. Anil Jain Shastri
Summary
The article examines the concept of *naya* (partial standpoint or analytical perspective) as presented in Ācārya Vidyānanda’s *Yuktyanuśāsanālaṅkāra*, situating it within the wider Jain epistemological and philosophical tradition. It argues that Jain thought, unlike non-Jain systems that often privilege a single attribute of reality, requires *naya* to understand the many-sided (*anekāntic*) nature of objects. The discussion explains the importance, necessity, definition, characteristics, and classifications of *naya*, while comparing Vidyānanda’s views with earlier and later Jain authorities. The article emphasizes that *naya* operates alongside *pramāṇa* (valid knowledge) but differs from it by apprehending only one aspect of a multifaceted reality, whereas *pramāṇa* grasps an object more comprehensively. Vidyānanda defines *naya* as a standpoint that interprets a specific attribute of an object, organizes discourse through contextual emphasis, and avoids absolutism by recognizing partial truth. The text outlines two principal divisions—*dravyārthika naya* (substance-oriented) and *paryāyārthika naya* (mode-oriented)—along with the classical sevenfold classification: *naigama*, *saṃgraha*, *vyavahāra*, *ṛjusūtra*, *śabda*, *samabhirūḍha*, and *evambhūta*, including their subdivisions and interpretive functions. Drawing on Jain scriptures and philosophers such as Umāsvāti, Samantabhadra, Siddhasena, Akalaṅka, Kundakunda, Pūjyapāda, Devasena, Vīrasena, Prabhācandra, and others, the article shows broad continuity in the understanding of *naya*, despite terminological variations. It also discusses distinctions such as *sunaya–durnaya*, *sāpekṣa–nirapekṣa naya*, and the relation of *niścaya* and *vyavahāra naya* to the two main divisions. The final pages contain extensive scholarly references and a brief publication acknowledgement/advertisement included in the journal issue. [The revised article was received after revision in June 2010, as noted in the publication record.]
Summary reviewed by a volunteer editor.
Conclusion
The article concludes that *naya* in Jain philosophy functions as an indispensable method for understanding reality without reducing it to a single, absolute standpoint. Through Ācārya Vidyānanda’s interpretation in *Yuktyanuśāsanālaṅkāra*, the text presents knowledge as necessarily perspectival: valid understanding emerges when partial viewpoints are recognized as complementary rather than exclusive. By linking *naya* with *anekāntavāda*, *pramāṇa*, and layered interpretive methods, the article ultimately argues that intellectual clarity, philosophical coherence, and inter-doctrinal harmony depend on disciplined acknowledgment of plurality within truth rather than one-sided certainty.